Conflict Co-operation Agricultural Trade <TITLE> <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=windows-1252"> <META NAME="Generator" CONTENT="Microsoft Word 97"> <META NAME="Template" CONTENT="C:\PROGRAM FILES\MICROSOFT OFFICE\OFFICE\html.dot"> <X-SAS-WINDOW TOP=23 BOTTOM=451 LEFT=155 RIGHT=685></HEAD> <BODY LINK="#0000ff" VLINK="#800080" BACKGROUND="../../Images/Image9.jpg"> <P></P> <B><FONT COLOR="#000080"><P ALIGN="CENTER">Eco Landuse Systems <IMG SRC="../../Images/Logo3.gif" WIDTH=18 HEIGHT=28></P> </B></FONT><FONT FACE="Arial" SIZE=2><P ALIGN="CENTER">e-mail: </FONT><A HREF="mailto:david.vanzetti@elspl.com.au"><FONT FACE="Arial" SIZE=2>david.vanzetti@elspl.com.au</FONT></A><FONT FACE="Arial" SIZE=2> website </FONT><A HREF="http://www.elspl.com.au"><FONT FACE="Arial" SIZE=2>www.elspl.com.au</FONT></A></P> <P><HR></P> <B>(C4) Vanzetti, D.M. (1990), `Conflict and Co-operation in Agricultural Trade', Scottish Agricultural Economics Review, issue no. 5, pp 13-28.</P> </FONT><P>Abstract</P></B> <P>Agricultural trade in the 1980s has been charaterised by conflict rather than cooperation. The use of export subsidies, for example, resulted in substantial falls in world prices as exporters competed with each other in an attempt to reduce stocks and to maintain or improve market share. Disregarding strategic effects, such policies seem far removed from the trade liberalisation that is commonly espoused. Why is the observed reality so different from the theoretically preferred Pareto optimal free trade policies. Three reasons are the concentrated market structure of many agricultural products, the distributional preferences of governments, and the inability of free traders to enforce international cooperation. These factors are analysed using a game theoretic framework, which is applied to the international wheat market.</P> <P> <HR></P> <P> </P> <P> </P> <P> </P></BODY> </HTML>